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Introduction? 
The UK’s monetary policy has twin objectives of 
price and financial stability. Consequently, the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of Bank of Eng-
land (BoE) has to maintain 2% target inflation as 
required by the Treasury, whilst the Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC) monitors the systemic risks to the 
financial markets. There are various channels 
through which the impact of monetary policy could 
be transmitted to the economy and these have been 
discussed in the extant literature (see for example, 
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, Bernanke and Kuttner, 
2005). Mishkin (1996) explains how stock markets 
act as one of the important channels of monetary 
policy transmission. Changes in the monetary pol-
icy, measured either using changes in money supply 
or changes in short term interest rates, should induce 
revaluations in the stock market. Contractionary or 
expansionary monetary policy should affect future 
expected returns through the changes in discount 
rates at which the future expected dividends are 
discounted. This paper investigates the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the equity risk premium 
(ERP) in the UK before and after the quantitative 
easing (QE) which was introduced in the wake of 
2007-2008 financial crisis. 
There is extensive research that examines the re-
sponse of stock market returns to domestic monetary 
policy shocks, particularly in the US. (see, for ex-
ample, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Thorbecke 
(1997), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Rigobon and 
Sack (2003, 2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), 
Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2008) and Castelnuovo 
and Nisticò (2010)]. However, research on the UK 
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market is relatively sparse and dated. Bredin, Hyde, 
Nitzsche and O’reilly (2007) examine the behavior 
of UK stock returns both at aggregate and industry 
level in response to UK domestic monetary policy 
shocks. They decompose the changes in the policy 
rate as expected and unexpected changes and report 
that the impact of monetary policy shocks on the UK 
stock market is heterogeneous, i.e., the sensitivity of 
aggregate stock market to the shocks in the domestic 
policy changes is different as compared to the im-
pact at the industry level. While the impact of mone-
tary policy shocks on the stock market before the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been studied under 
the conventional monetary policy framework, the 
impact on the ERP before and after unconventional 
monetary policy is still emerging.  
Under the conventional monetary policy, BoE uses 
inflation targeting which is operationalized using a 
single monetary policy instrument, i.e., the interest 
rate. However, in the aftermath of the financial cri-
sis, BoE was confronted with multiple challenges. 
On the hand, it was required to maintain the target 
inflation and on the other hand, it had to provide 
liquidity to the interbank market. As a consequence, 
the MPC was authorised by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to set up large scale Asset Purchase Fa-
cility (APF). Under this facility, the BoE purchased 
high quality assets such as Treasury Bills and Bonds 
from the private sector financed by creating central 
bank reserves. In addition to buying government 
securities, the BoE also purchased private sector 
assets such as corporate bonds to provide much 
needed liquidity.1 Thus, the QE became the primary 
monetary policy tool for the BoE. 
                                                     
1This form of unconventional monetary policy was first adopted by the 
Japanese Central Bank in the 1990s and is known as quantitative easing 
(QE), because the monetary policy is operationalized by purchasing 
large quantities of high quality assets which leads to the expansion of 
the balance sheet of the bank rather than through the traditional 
interest rate lever.  
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The channels through which the QE programme can 
affect asset prices are discussed by Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen, (2011). Out of the seven 
possible channels that they postulate, the signalling 
channel seems to be more promising. Under this 
channel, the inclination of a central bank to keep the 
interest rate lower than that implied by the Taylor 
(1993) rule leads to lower yields on long-term bonds 
and higher prices of risky assets.  In the case of the 
UK, Miles, (2011, 2012) discusses two main 
channels of transmission of QE effects to the  
broader asset markets. The first is the portfolio 
substitution channel which is also known as 
portfolio re-balancing channel 1. Under this channel, 
the BoE buys gilts from the non-bank  private sector 
investors, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies by financing the purchase using central 
bank reserves. However, these deposits are likely to 
be imperfect substitutes of the assets that are sold by 
the private sector to the BoE. Since pension funds 
and insurance companies have long-dated liabilites, 
they match the libaility duration by purchasing long 
term government bonds. This leads to declining 
yields on long dated bond, thus, reducing the term-
premia. Additionally, declining yields on long term 
bonds encourage the private sector to raise new debt 
for financing new investments and/or dividend 
payments to equity holders2. 
The genesis of the portfolio rebalancing channel 
could also be found in the monetary portfolio model 
(the name was coined by Rozeff (1974), developed 
by Friedman (1961)). In this model, investors are 
expected to attain equilibrium between different 
assets in their portfolio which includes money. Any 
exogenous monetary shock such as arising from 
changes to money supply would encourage investors 
to exchange cash for equities and/or bonds. This will 
affect real money balances and returns on equities 
and bonds. 
The second channel through which the effects of QE 
could be transmitted to broader asset markets and  
ultimately to the wider economy is through the bank 
lending. Since the BoE finances purchase of gilts 
from bank and non-bank instititions through 
reserves, there is an overall rise in deposits in the 
banking system. This leads to an overall increase in 
lending to the small and medium scale industries 
and household sector which, in turn, encourages 
investors to invest in riskier assets such as equities. 
                                                     
1 The theoretical underpinning of portfolio re-balancing channel, i.e., the 
idea of imperfect asset substitution has a long tradition in macroeco-
nomics (see, Tobin, 1969). 
2See, The Distributional Effects of Asset Purchases. Bank of England 
12th July 2012. Available through: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/ 
nr073.pdf. 
Figure 1(see Appendix) provides anecdotal evidence 
of the impact of QE on the UK stock prices. In 
particular, the figure shows the impact of QE 
announcements on the closing prices of FTSE 100 
index. The effects are clearly visible following the 
BoE’s decisions in March 2009 to purchase £75 
billion of assets, in October 2011 to increase the QE 
programme to £275 billion, and in July 2012 to 
further increase the asset purchases to £375 billion.  
Extant research too, shows the efficacy of uncon-
ventional monetary policy and its impact on various 
asset prices. For example, Gagnon et al. (2010, 
2011) show that QE not only reduces the yields of 
bonds bought under the scheme, but also yields of 
bonds which were not purchased under the Large 
Scale Asset Purchase programme. The findings re-
ported by Gagnon et al., (2010, 2011) are further 
supplemented by Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong 
(2011) who investigate the impact of QE programme 
on the UK asset prices. They find that following the 
QE, the yields of the investment and speculative 
grade corporate bonds decline by 70 basis points 
(bps) and 150 bps respectively. Additionally, they 
also investigate the impact of QE on equity prices 
around the announcement of the QE programme. 
They conclude that equity prices show an increase 
since the start of QE in March 2009. Further, Meier 
(2009) provides evidence of decline in yields fol-
lowing BoE’s asset purchase programme. Glick and 
Leduc (2012) suggest that the impact on yields is not 
restricted to the US and UK as their research shows 
that long term interest rates decline globally follow-
ing the announcements of the QE programme by the 
Federal Reserve (FED) and the BoE.  
Although there is a consensus that QE leads to de-
clining bond yields, it is not empirically shown how 
the QE affects the ERP.  In this paper, we investi-
gate and compare the response of ERP to the mone-
tary policy shocks before and after the introduction 
of QE. The approaches to identify exogenous mone-
tary policy shocks can be broadly classified in two 
categorized; event study and Structural Vector Auto-
regression (SVAR). Previous research which use the 
event study approach have significant limitations. In 
an event study approach, the strategy of analysing 
impact of monetary policy shocks on asset market 
returns around a narrow window of time, does not 
explicitly account for the feedback rule. It is impor-
tant that the model should include feedback based 
on changes to other macroeconomic variables such 
inflation, changes in unemployment, etc. to capture 
the impact of monetary policy shocks. The SVAR 
approach explicitly accounts for a feedback rule. 
One of the distinguishing features of monetary pol-
icy shocks identified using SAVRs is that, apart 
from being exogenous, they represent the deviations 
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from expected policy response. These deviations 
may arise from discretionary policy due to abnormal 
events, changes in the composition of MPC, changes 
in either the weights associated with target variables, 
and/or changing the target variables itself. Further, 
as the systematic component of monetary policy can 
be captured by a standard monetary policy reaction 
rule, the deviations from such a rule can also be 
interpreted as a non-systematic component of mone-
tary policy (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 
1996;1999 and Kilian 2012).  
We, therefore, use SVAR approach which over-
comes the limitation of the event study approach. 
Further, innovations in the short-term interest rates 
derived from SVAR are a more reliable proxy of 
monetary policy shocks (Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992 and Sims, 1992. Subsequently Gali, 1992, 
Pagan, 1995, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 
1996; 1999 Kim, 2001 and others have relied on 
identifying monetary policy shocks as innovations in 
the short term interest rates rather than money sup-
ply. In the paper, we use shocks in interest rates as a 
proxy of monetary policy shocks. There is evidence 
which suggests surprises in interest instruments 
should be a preferred way to measure monetary 
policy shocks. For example, Eggertsson and 
Woodford, 2003 suggest that although at zero-lower 
bound a central bank can stimulate the economy by 
purchasing assets on open market and thereby (in 
theory) expanding the monetary base, yet such a 
policy cannot be entirely considered as a main pol-
icy instrument. They stress that optimal monetary 
policy can be operationalized by using short-term 
interest as a policy instrument. We, therefore, rely 
on this normative framework and extract the struc-
tural monetary policy shocks in the interest rate 
instrument of monetary policy using a  
SVAR approach1. 
We investigate the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the aggregate and disaggregate data. We 
calculate monthly ERP for the FTSE 100, FTSE 
250, and ten sectoral FTSE ALL indices which in-
clude Basic Materials, Consumer Services, Con-
sumer Goods, Financials, Healthcare, Industrials, 
Oil and Gas, Telecom, Utilities and Technology. 
Use of disaggregated data will enable us to confirm 
whether the impact of monetary policy shocks is 
heterogeneous amongst the various industries. There 
are several reasons the impact may differ across 
industries. First, the demand for product and ser-
vices may have different interest rate-sensitivity. 
Second, under the rational assumption that exchange 
                                                     
1 SVAR approach is the workhorse of macroeconomics to analyse the 
rich dynamic effects of structural shocks in the monetary policy 
[see,Bernanke (1986),Thorbecke (1997),Bjørnland and Leitemo 
(2009),Lastrapes (1998); and Neri (2004)] 
rates may respond to monetary policy shocks, the 
sensitivity of demand for the tradable goods and 
services may change due to fluctuations in the ex-
change rate caused by the monetary policy shocks. 
Third, capital-intensive industries, cyclical indus-
tries and financial services industries may react dif-
ferently due to different interest-rate sensitivities 
(Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004). 
We also investigate the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the 25 Fama-French style value weighted 
portfolios based on the firm characteristics such as 
size and book-to-market ratios. Since Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) show that the risk premia varies 
across the cross-section of the market (i.e. size and 
the value premia are different), we expect that 
monetary policy shocks may have heterogeneous 
impact on the portfolios formed on the basis of value 
and size. By investigating the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on the ERP of portfolios constructed 
on the basis of size and value characteristics, we will 
be able to validate other channels of monetary pol-
icy transmission vis-à-vis the balance sheet channel 
and the bank lending channel (Mishkin, 1996). The 
balance sheet channel implies that a positive mone-
tary policy shock would severely dampen the reve-
nues of firms, particularly small firms, and increase 
their cost of financing. On the other hand, the bank 
lending channel has more direct impact on small 
firms. Small firms depend more on bank loans than 
big firms. In the event of positive monetary policy 
shocks, credit becomes more expensive for small 
firms. In either case, positive monetary policy shock 
could lead to an increase in the ERP depending on 
the firm size. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is three-
fold. First, as far as we are aware, there is no study 
that has shown the impact of monetary policy 
shocks before and after the implementation of QE. 
Second, as suggested by Doh, Cao and Molling 
(2015), the impact of monetary policy shocks on 
ERP may reveal useful insights of the effects of 
macroeconomic events which are not captured by 
conventional macroeconomic factors such as infla-
tion and output gap. Finally, since ERP is a key 
component for evaluating the cost of capital and 
asset allocation decisions, it is vital to understand 
how it responds to monetary policy innovations.  
Our results show that a positive monetary policy 
shock, i.e. when the actual interest rates are more 
than the expected interest rates has a negative im-
pact on the ERP of most of the FTSE Indices. How-
ever, the magnitudes of the sensitivities of the ERP 
are different suggesting that monetary policy shocks 
have a heterogeneous impact on different industries. 
Our findings are similar for the 25 Fama-French 
style value-weighted portfolios constructed on size 
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and book-to-market ratios. Our results are consistent 
with those reported by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
for the US market. Additionally, we find that excess 
returns of the value stocks are statistically more 
sensitive to the monetary policy shocks than the 
growth stocks.  
Most notably, we report evidence of asymmetric 
response to the monetary policy shocks before and 
after the QE. Before the introduction of QE, the ERP 
react negatively to the monetary policy shocks. 
However, after QE, the monetary policy shocks have 
a positive impact on the ERP. We find similar re-
sults for the 25 Fama-French style portfolios. These 
results suggest that QE has had a positive effect on 
equity returns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 
1 explains methodology, Section 2 describes the 
data, Section 3 reports empirical results, and Section 
4 concludes.  
1. Methodology 
1.1. Identification of monetary policy shocks. We 
identify structural monetary policy shocks by in-
cluding a set of macroeconomic variables and a 
monetary policy instrument using the SVAR frame-
work. The SVAR approach allows modelling of the 
non-recursive structures with parsimonious set  
of variables.  
We model the economy using the following the 
SAVR. 
??? ? ????????? ? ???                                        (1) 
where Y is a n dimensional vector of macroeco-
nomic variables including a monetary policy vari-
able, ????? is the pth order polynomial matrix in the 
lag operator L, ? is the ? ? ? matrix of contempora-
neous coefficients,  ? is a ? ? ? matrix relating the 
structural innovations ?? to the reduced form inno-
vations and ????????? is a ? ? ? vector of struc-
tural shocks which assume ortho-normal co-variance 
matrix as an identity matrix, i.e., ???? ??? ? ?. 
In order to estimate (1), we, first, estimate the re-
duced form of (1) which is  
?? ? ???????? ? ??,                                             (2) 
where??? is the reduced form residuals such that  
???? ? ? 
????? ???= 
? when 
? ? ? 
(3) 
0, when 
? ? ? 
? ? ????? ???is the residual covariance matrix. Con-
dition (3) implies that there is no serial correlation 
among the reduced-form disturbances, however, 
contemporaneous correlation is allowed. Following 
Amisano and Giannini (1997) and Lutkephol (2005), 
we have: 
?? ?? ? ??? (4) 
The assumption of ortho-normal covariance matrix 
of the structural shocks leads to following condition 
???? ? ??? (5) 
Thus, we have ?? ??? ? ?? equations and ?? ele-
ments in ? and ? each, which leads to additional 
??? ? ?? ??? ? ?? restrictions to just identify the 
elements in  ? and??. We impose short-run restric-
tions on ? and ? with ? to be a lower triangular 
matrix with ones along the diagonal and  ? to be a 
diagonal matrix in order to extract the structural 
orthogonal monetary policy shocks. The lower tri-
angularity implies standard Cholesky decomposi-
tions of the variance-covariance matrix which has 
economic implications. The short-run restrictions 
implied by (4) were also used by Gali (1992) and 
Pagan (1995) to study and test the traditional IS-LM 
model to the post-war US data. 
We consider five macroeconomic variables in the 
SVAR. Out of the five macroeconomic variables, 
four are the information variables and the fifth is the 
monetary policy variable. Thus, we have  
?? ? ???? ??? ????? ??????? (6) 
where the information variable ?? is the output gap 
which is measured by the deviation of index of the 
industrial production from its trend,?? is the infla-
tion gap, measured using the deviation of the actual 
inflation from the target inflation,???? is the unem-
ployment rate, ?? is the trade-weighted effective 
exchange rate index and ??? is the monetary policy 
instrument. We use the BOE’s base rate as the pol-
icy instrument to estimate the structural monetary 
policy shocks. 
By ordering the variables in this fashion, we assume 
that all the four information variables contempora-
neously affect the monetary policy variable; how-
ever the monetary policy affects these variables only 
with lag. It takes some time for output gap, inflation 
gap, unemployment and changes in exchange rates 
to respond to monetary policy actions. These as-
sumptions are consistent with Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996). The structural mone-
tary policy shocks are then the corresponding distur-
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bances in (1). The last equation in the VAR resem-
bles monetary policy reaction function or the feed-
back rule which can be considered as a modified 
Taylor (1993) rule. It also takes into account the 
Okun's(1962) law. We include trade-weighted ex-
change rate as an information variable, since the 
BOE follows open-economy monetary policy (Ball, 
1999a, 1999b; Svensson, 2000).  
Equation (4) can be expressed in the matrix form as; 
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ???? ? ? ? ?
??? ??? ? ? ?
??? ??? ??? ? ?
??? ??? ??? ??? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
???
?????
???
???? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???? ? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ?
? ? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ??? ?
? ? ? ? ????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ??
?
?????
?????
???
???? ?
?
?
?
?
?
 
 
(7) 
Thus, from (7), the structural monetary policy 
shocks are estimated1 as: 
???? ???? ? ???? ??? ? ???? ??? ? ???? ?????
? ???? ??? ? ???? 
(8) 
2.1. The impact of monetary policy shocks on the 
ERP. In the previous sub-section we described the 
methodology to uncover the structural monetary 
policy shocks. We now examine the effect of these 
structural shocks on the UK ERP by estimating the 
following regression model;    
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ???? (9) 
Where,???? is the UK ERP (measured using the ex-
pot excess returns on portfolio i over the 1-month 
treasury bills rate), ??is the constant which can also 
be interpreted as pricing error, ?? is the sensitivity of 
the ERP of the ith portfolio to the monetary policy 
shocks ????and ???? is a white noise process. We 
investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks for 
three types of portfolios. In the first portfolio, we 
calculate excess returnsfor two popular and mostly 
tracked indices in the UK, the FTSE 100 index and 
the FTSE 250 index. These two indices serve as a 
benchmark for most of the fund managers. In the 
second portfolio, we compute excess returns for ten 
most widely used UK sectoral indices. In the third 
                                                     
1See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) and Kim (2001). 
portfolio, we calculate the excess returns on value-
weighted 25 Fama-French-style portfolios sorted on 
size and book-to-market. The goal here is to exam-
ine whether the impact is consistent and significant. 
Model (9) is estimated using maximum likelihood 
technique employing Marquardt optimisation algo-
rithm assuming that errors follow a normal distribu-
tion. This is because our initial estimation of model 
(9) using OLS showed the presence of ARCH ef-
fects in the residuals. 
2. Data description 
We obtain monthly data for the period of January 
1988 to October 2014 from DataStream. To measure 
the output gap, we use the seasonally adjusted index 
of industrial production. The output gap is estimated 
as the deviation of the index of industrial production 
from its potential trend.2 The inflation gap is esti-
mated using the deviation of actual inflation from 
the target inflation. The UK adopted inflation target 
regime in October 1992 following the departure of 
the UK from the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The 
target annual inflation was in the range of 1% - 4%, 
as measured by the inflation in the Retail Price In-
dex excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX). 
In May 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer set 
the initial target of 2.5%.  In December 2003, the 
annual inflation target was once again changed to 
2% measured in inflation of Harmonized Consumer 
Price Index (HCPI). In our study, we use 2.5% an-
nual inflation target in RPIX until November 2003 
and a target of 2% annual in HCPI from December 
2004. Unemployment rate is measured as unem-
ployed workforce as a percentage of economically 
active workforce claiming unemployment benefits 
i.e., Job Seekers Allowance and National Insurance 
Credits. The trade-weighted exchange rate of the 
British Sterling Pound is measured using Effective 
Exchange Rate Index. We calculate the ERP as the 
difference between monthly returns3 of FTSE 100 
index, FTSE 250 index and the ten major sectors 
and the yield on 1-month UK treasury bills. The 
returns on the 25 Fama-French style portfolios are 
taken from Gregory, Tharyan and Christidis, (2013).  
Table 1 (see Appendix Table 1) provides the de-
scriptive statistics. Panel A shows that over the sam-
ple period, the average annualised growth rate in the 
industrial production is 0.08%. The average inflation 
is 3.13%. On average the trade weighted effective 
exchange rate has declined with an average annual 
rate of -0.4%. The average base rate has been 5.5% 
for the sample period. 
                                                     
2The trend of the index of the industrial production is estimated via the 
Hodrick Prescott filter using the “punishing” parameter (? ?14400), 
3The returns are calculated using total returns index which include 
dividends. 
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Panel B provides descriptive statistics of annualised 
ERP of FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and the ten sector 
indices. It can be seen from Panel B that on an aver-
age, Utilities is the best performing sector with aver-
age annual ERP of 8.96% while the Technology 
sector offers the lowest ERP of 1.16%. Overall, on 
average ERPs are positive for all portfolios. Panel C 
provides the descriptive statistics of the annualised 
ERPs of the 25 value-weighted Fama-French style 
portfolios based on size and book-to-market charac-
teristics. For simplicity we maintain the same nam-
ing convention of the portfolios as in Gregory et. al. 
(2013). The average annualised ERP of small size 
portfolios is 6.82% while the average ERP of big 
size portfolios is 5.16%. On the growth and value 
dimensions, the average annualised ERPs of growth 
and value portfolios are 4.8% and 7.8% respectively. 
3.?Results 
3.1. The impact of structural monetary policy 
shocks on ERP. First, we examine the impact of the 
contemporaneous structural monetary policy shocks. 
This gives us an overall understanding of how ERP 
of aggregate market, ten different sectors and 25 
Fama-French portfolios respond to the structural 
monetary policy shocks over the entire sample pe-
riod. We estimate the regression model (9) and re-
port the results in Table 2 (see Appendix). 
We find that the monetary policy shocks impacts the 
ERP negatively.  Although there is heterogeneity in 
the magnitude and the significance of the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on different FTSE indices, 
yet with the only exception of the utilities sector, 
ERPs of all other sectors react negatively. Whilst, 
Basic Materials, Financials, Consumer services, 
Industrials, Telecom and Technology sectors react 
significantly to the contemporaneous monetary 
policy shocks, the Utilities and Oil & Gas sectors do 
not respond to the monetary policy shocks. This 
could be attributed to the counter-cyclical nature of 
utility and oil & gas sectors. The results are qualita-
tively similar to that of Bredin et al., (2007) for the 
UK equity market. 
Next we investigate the response of 25 Fama-French 
style value-weighted portfolios formed on the basis 
of size and book-to-market ratio. The ERPs of 
Fama-French portfolios also react negatively to the 
structural monetary policy shocks. The ERPs of 
small cap stocks are more sensitive to the monetary 
policy shocks than the big cap stocks. The average 
sensitivity of the ERP of small stocks is -0.76 while 
the average sensitivity of ERP of big stocks is -0.55. 
We can see that the average responsiveness of the 
ERP to the monetary policy shocks decreases as one 
move from small size portfolios to large size portfo-
lios. The results confirm that small companies are 
more vulnerable to monetary policy shocks and 
therefore need to offer higher excess returns. Small 
firms relay heavily on bank as compared to big 
firms. Further, small firms are more “financially 
constrained” in the sense that they may be required to 
post additional good quality collateral for accessing 
bank credit facilities or to refinance the existing debt.  
With regard to value and growth dimensions, the 
ERP of value stocks and growth stocks are expected 
to react differently. As shown by Kuttner, (2001), 
the short-end of the term structure reacts much more 
than the long-end of the term structure to the mone-
tary policy shocks. Therefore, ERPs of companies 
whose revenues and earnings are sensitive to short-
term interest rate fluctuations will respond much 
more to the monetary policy shocks. Based on this 
reasoning and the way growth and value portfolios 
are constructed, it is reasonable to expect that the 
ERP of value stocks should be more sensitive to 
monetary policy shocks than the ERPs of growth 
stocks. Another reason for this difference is that 
value stocks have higher expected cash flows rela-
tive to their market prices as compared to the growth 
stocks. Therefore, any significant changes to the 
cash flows due to monetary policy shocks will have 
a more significant impact on the ERPs of value 
stocks than the ERPs of growth stocks.  
Results reported in table 3 (see Appendix) clearly 
support the above reasoning. The ERP of value 
stocks are not only statistically sensitive to monetary 
policy shocks but also in terms of magnitude; the 
value stocks seems to be more sensitive to monetary 
policy shocks than that of growth stocks. The aver-
age sensitivity of the ERP of value stocks is -0.93 
while the average sensitivity of ERP of growth 
stocks is -0.42. In summary, the ERPs of small size 
and value portfolios are more sensitive to the mone-
tary policy shocks than the portfolios of big size and 
growth stocks. 
3.2. The impact of structural monetary policy 
shocks on ERP, before and after quantitative 
easing 
Next we examine the response of ERP to monetary 
policy shocks before and after the implementation of 
the QE. As discussed earlier, empirical evidence on 
the impact of unconventional monetary policy be-
fore and after QE on the UK’s ERP is non-existent. 
For this purpose, we divide the sample into two 
groups using March 2009 as the breakpoint when 
the BOE launched the first round of QE. The pre-QE 
sample runs from January 1988 to February 2009 
and the post-QE sample spans from March 2009 till 
October 2014.1 
                                                     
1It is worth noting that though the BOE halted its QE programme in July 
2012, the Bank is still maintaining its accommodative monetary policy 
stance.    
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Table 4 (see Appendix) shows that the response of 
ERPs of aggregate FTSE indices and various sec-
toral indices, before and after the QE. By comparing 
columns (B) and (D) of table 4, we can see a re-
markable difference between the sensitivity of 
ERPs. Before QE, ERPs react negatively to the 
structural monetary policy shocks as all beta coeffi-
cients are negative. While after the QE, sensitivities 
of the ERPs to the monetary policy shocks are posi-
tive for almost all industries, except for the Health-
care which shows a negative response. However, it 
is not statistically significant.  
The magnitudes of the sensitivity of the ERPs to the 
monetary policy shocks in the post-QE period are 
higher. The ERPs of the various FTSE indices after 
the QE show greater response compared to the re-
sponse before the QE. For example, before the QE, 
the sensitivity of ERP ofthe FTSE 100 index was -
0.712% which suggests that a positive one percent 
change in the interest rate shock would decrease the 
ERP of the FTSE 100 index by an average of 
0.712% (monthly). After the QE this sensitivity has 
increased to 2.4%. The paired sample t-statistics 
with unequal variances (not reported) for the hy-
pothesis that the average ?????????? ? ? ??? ????? ? is 
-8.10 suggesting that the average response of the 
ERP of these FTSE indices to the monetary policy 
shocks before and after QE is statistically signifi-
cantly different at 1% level. 
Table 5 (see Appendix) reports the impact of mone-
tary policy shocks on the ERPs of the 25 Fama-
French style value-weighted portfolios. We can see 
a similar pattern of reaction of ERPs of these portfo-
lios before and after QE. Before QE, the ERPs re-
spond negatively. However after QE, the ERPs are 
positive. The paired sample t-statistics with unequal 
variances for the hypothesis that the average 
???????? ?? ? ??????? ??  is -14.23 suggesting that the 
average response of the ERP of these 25 portfolios 
to the monetary policy shocks before and after QE is 
statistically significantly different at 1% level. The 
average responses of the ERPs of small size portfo-
lios (2.05) and value portfolios (3.39) to monetary 
policy shocks are still more than the ERPs of the big 
size (1.98) and growth portfolios (1.45) after QE.  
One possible explanation for the asymmetric re-
sponse is that increased liquidity may have inflated 
the prices of risky assets such as equities. Conse-
quently any withdrawal of the liquidity from the 
markets induced by unexpected interest rate changes 
could potentially impact the prices of the risky as-
sets and by extension the risk premium provided by 
these assets, i.e., the ERP. Another possible explana-
tion is that during QE, the BoE purchased high qual-
ity fixed income securities financed by central bank 
reserves thus effectively replacing relatively illiquid 
money with liquid cash reserves. This led to decline 
in both short and long term bond yields and, thus, 
leading to higher excess equity returns. 
With an aim to examine the direct impact of mone-
tary policy shocks when QE announcements were 
made, we run the following regression using maxi-
mum-likelihood estimation with heteroscedasticity 
consistent robust standard errors and covariance 
(Bollerslev and Woolridge, 1992) for the entire 
sample; 
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ????? ????? ????????    (10) 
where, ???? is the ERPs of the various FTSE indices 
and that of the 25 Fama-French portfolios,  ???? is 
the monetary policy shocks (interest rate shocks) 
extracted from the SVAR (1),   ? is a binary dummy 
variable that takes a value 1 for the months when the 
MPC announced an increase in the QE and 0 other-
wise. There were seven occasions when the MPC 
announced an increase in the QE. The parameter ?? 
captures the impact of interaction between monetary 
policy shocks and the month in which the changes to 
the QE were announced on ERP of the ith portfolio. 
The parameter ?? is the sensitivity of ERP of the ith 
portfolio to monetary policy shocks.  
By comparing columns (B) and (C) in Table 6 (see 
Appendix), we can clearly see the asymmetric im-
pact of monetary policy shocks during the QE an-
nouncements as the ?? ?? are positive and  significant 
except for Utilities and Telecom sectors. Column 
(D) shows the Wald’s F-statistic for the null hy-
pothesis??? ? ?? ? ?. Except for Consumer Goods 
and Utilities, the Wald statistic is statistically sig-
nificant for the rest thus confirming the asymmetric 
response of ERPs to the monetary policy shocks.1 
These results support the previous results reported in 
Table 4. 
Panel C of Table 7 (see Appendix) show the impact 
of monetary policy shocks on the ERPs of the 25 
Fama-French portfolios for the months when there 
was an announcement of QE programmes i.e. the 
parameter ?? in model (10). The results show statis-
tically significant response to the QE programmes 
(??>0). Panel D presents the Wald’s F-statistic for 
the null hypothesis that ?? and ?? are jointly equal to 
zero. The null hypothesis is rejected for almost all 
the portfolios suggesting that the response of ERP of 
these 25 portfolios is asymmetric. These results 
support the earlier findings reported in Table 5. 
                                                     
1However, our results should be interpreted with caution since there may be 
other unobserved factors such as investor sentiments [see Brown and Cliff, 
2005; Kumar and Lee, 2006 and Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007] which 
could influence the response of equity markets to the monetary policy 
shocks. That being said, those other factors could also be influenced by 
unexpected tightening/easing of monetary policy (Kurov, 2010).  
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Summary and conclusions 
The paper empirically investigates the impact of UK 
domestic monetary policy shocks on the ERPs of 
aggregate market, ten industries, as well as the 25 
Fama-French style portfolios. We extract structural 
monetary policy shocks as residuals of the feedback 
rule from SVAR and study the asset pricing implica-
tions before and after the implementation of QE. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature by 
offering evidence of asymmetric response of ERP to 
monetary policy shocks before and after the imple-
mentation of unconventional monetary policy.  
We find that for the entire sample period, the struc-
tural domestic monetary policy shocks have a statis-
tically significant negative impact. Results suggest 
that a positive structural monetary policy shock i.e. 
when the actual interest rates are more than the ex-
pected interest rates, induces negative impact on the 
ERP of almost all of the sectoral indices. However 
the magnitude of the response to the monetary pol-
icy shocks is heterogeneous confirming the pro-
cyclical and counter cyclical behaviour of different 
industries. Empirical evidence for the ERPs of 25 
Fama-French portfolios constructed on size and 
book to market characteristics also show similar 
heterogeneous impact. Overall the ERPs of small 
size stocks are more sensitive to the structural mone-
tary policy shocks than the ERP of big size shocks 
suggesting the presence of the balance sheet and the 
bank lending channels of the monetary transmission. 
Similarly, ERPs of value portfolios are more sensi-
tive to the monetary policy shocks than portfolios of 
growth stocks.  
Last but not the least, we investigate the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the ERPs of FTSE indi-
ces before and after QE. Our empirical results show 
that before the implementation of QE, the monetary 
policy shocks have negative impact on the ERPs of 
aggregate market, various industries as well as 
Fama-French portfolios. However for the post-QE 
period, the impact is positive. The empirical evi-
dence provided in the paper sheds light on the equity 
market’s asymmetric response to the BoE’s policy 
before and after the monetary stimulus. 
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Appendix 
 
Fig. 1: FTSE 100 adjusted closing prices and the QE decisions 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
Descriptive ?? ? Uemp ?? R 
      
Mean (%) 0.084 3.13 5.01 -0.40 5.5 
Median (%) 1.10 3.37 4.50 -0.16 5.06 
Standard Deviation (%) 3.20 1.41 2.178 5.37 3.82 
Kurtosis 2.98 8.69 -0.58 4.55 0.25 
Skewness -0.73 1.15 0.77 -1.01 0.72 
No. of Months 322 322 322 322 322 
 
Note: E100 is the excess return of FTSE 100 index. Similarly, E250 is for FTSE 250 index, EOnG is of FTSE All share Oil and 
Gas, EBM is of FTSE All share Basic Materials, Eind is of FTSE All share Industrials, ECGDs is of FTSE All share Consumer 
Goods, Ehlth is of FTSE All share Healthcare, ECSvs is of FTSE All share Consumer services, Etel is of FTSE All share Telecoms, 
Eutl is of FTSE All share utilities, Efin is of FTSE All share Financials and Etech is of FTSE All Share technology. 
 
Panel B 
Descriptive E100 E250 EOnG EBM Eind ECGDs Ehlth ECSvs Etel Eutl Efin Etech 
Mean (%) 3.56 5.76 5.02 2.61 3.31 4.48 5.38 1.98 3.75 8.96 3.63 1.16 
Median (%) 7.37 10.77 9.77 8.47 8.58 7.75 5.56 6.21 10.77 11.75 8.39 9.82 
Standard 
Deviation (%) 14.46 17.17 18.93 23.97 19.98 19.97 14.17 16.64 19.52 15.51 19.99 29.86 
Kurtosis 0.64 2.5 0.825 4.30 2.24 0.81 0.53 1.36 0.85 0.37 2.42 3.28 
Skewness -0.47 -0.77 -0.30 -0.91 -0.84 -0.34 -0.035 -0.58 -0.49 -0.12 -0.55 -0.62 
No. of Months 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 
Note: ?? is the growth rate of index of industrial production,  ? is inflation, Uemp is unemployment, ??, growth rate of sterling 
effective exchange rate and R is the base rate.  
Table 1. Continued 
Panel C 
Portfolio Mean (%) Median (%) Standard Deviation (%) Kurtosis Skewness No. of months 
SL 4.01 8.61 21.91 2.25 -0.22 322 
S2 6.50 10.06 18.80 0.72 -0.08 322 
S3 6.96 11.72 17.82 2.25 -0.02 322 
S4 7.96 8.74 17.90 2.76 -0.22 322 
SH 8.69 10.29 17.66 4.25 0.09 322 
S2L 3.08 7.53 23.10 2.66 -0.16 322 
S22 5.29 9.33 21.00 2.03 -0.72 322 
S23 6.37 8.46 18.61 1.55 -0.24 322 
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Table 1. Continued 
S24 7.07 6.12 19.32 1.30 -0.06 322 
S2H 7.50 12.97 22.26 5.95 0.33 322 
M3L 4.41 12.99 22.89 5.92 -0.81 322 
M32 3.56 9.17 20.58 1.79 -0.25 322 
M33 6.29 11.58 19.67 3.62 -0.84 322 
M34 5.69 8.90 20.71 1.64 -0.17 322 
M3H 9.87 9.22 21.93 3.37 0.05 322 
B4L 7.91 15.17 20.55 4.35 0.07 322 
B42 4.82 2.37 18.92 3.42 -0.31 322 
B43 8.76 7.57 18.49 1.66 -0.39 322 
B44 6.77 15.19 21.43 2.08 -0.25 322 
B4H 7.58 10.52 22.17 3.17 -0.26 322 
BL 4.51 5.79 14.45 0.30 -0.14 322 
B2 4.32 7.71 15.11 0.71 -0.40 322 
B3 5.58 6.51 17.10 1.46 -0.32 322 
B4 5.98 10.48 17.30 1.54 -0.37 322 
BH 5.39 9.91 18.80 1.53 -0.26 322 
Note : This panel provides annualised descriptive statistics of the ERPs of the 25 value-weighted Fama-French style portfolios con-
structed on the basis of size and book-to-market characteristics. The naming convention is same as in Gregory, Tharyan and 
Christidis, (2013). For example, “SH” denotes small cap-high book-to-market (BTM), “S4” denotes small and 4th lowest BTM, 
“B4” denotes big and 4th  highest BTM, “BH” denotes big size and highest BTM, “M3L” middle 3rd size and largest BTM and 
“M32” middle 3rd size and 2nd BTM  
Table 2. The impact of monetary policy shocks on ERP using base rate as monetary policy instrument 
FTSE Indices ?? ?? S.E of Regression 
FTSE 100 0.56*** -0.609** 0.042 
(2.60) (-2.36) 
FTSE 250 0.78*** -0.521** 0.049 
(2.89) (-2.07) 
Basic materials 0.459 -0.756** 0.069 
(1.23) (-2.45) 
Consumer services 0.591** -0.648*** 0.048 
(2.28) (-2.58) 
Financials 0.65** -0.743** 0.058 
(2.05) (-2.16) 
Consumer goods 0.625** -0.474* 0.058 
(2.10) (-1.67) 
Healthcare 0.626*** -0.468* 0.040 
(2.89) (-1.86) 
Industrials 0.55* -0.615** 0.057 
(1.90) (2.15) 
Oil and gas 0.501* -0.439 0.054 
(1.74) (-1.13) 
Utilities 0.895*** 0.181 0.044 
(3.66) (0.69) 
Telecom 0.596** -0.709** 0.056 
(2.13) (-2.28) 
Technology 0.475 -0.948*** 0.087 
(1.4) (-2.46) 
Note: The model estimated is (9). The dependent variable is the ERP of the FTSE indices (in percent). The independent variable is 
the structural base rate shock in the UK. Adjusted sample size Feb 1989 – Oct 2014 (no. of observations 309). The coefficients 
denote monthly sensitivities of the ERP of the FTSE  indices to monetary policy shocks (in decimals) *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. Figures in the parentheses are z-statistics. 
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Table 3. The impact of monetary policy shocks on the ERP of the 25 value-weighted  Fama-French portfolios 
??   Z-stat 
Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average 
Growth 0.701* 0.50* 0.76** 0.92*** 0.76*** 0.73 (1.91) (1.66) (2.22) (2.78) (3.47) 
BM2 0.882*** 0.74** 0.82** 0.78** 0.71*** 0.78 (3.08) (2.18) (2.49) (2.27) (2.91) 
BM3 0.95*** 0.73** 0.83*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 0.82 (3.37) (2.22) (2.93) (3.08) (3.03) 
BM4 0.97*** 0.88*** 0.54* 0.67** 0.58*** 0.73 (3.75) (2.6) (1.94) (2.39) (2.72) 
Value 0.96*** 0.92*** 0.76** 0.97*** 0.67** 0.86 (3.74) (3.0) (2.22) (3.09) (2.52) 
Average 0.89 0.75 0.81 0.84 0.69 
?? Z-Stat 
Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average 
Growth -0.64*** -0.76*** -0.2 -0.23 -0.26 -0.42 (-2.66) (-2.70) (-0.81) (-0.72) (-0.97) 
BM2 -0.48** -0.49* -0.95*** -0.64** -0.92*** -0.69 (-2.02) (-1.81) (-3.33) (-2.17) (-3.13) 
BM3 -0.77*** -0.62** -0.59** -0.78*** -0.59** -0.67 (-3.39) (-2.20) (-2.14) (-2.63) (-2.34) 
BM4 -0.99*** -1.04*** -0.34 -0.73 -0.43 -0.71 (-4.92) (-3.98) (-1.25) (-2.59) (-1.53) 
Value -0.92*** -0.85*** -1.24*** -1.07*** -0.56** -0.93 (-4.85) (-2.59) (-4.31) (-3.56) (-2.24) 
Average -0.76 -0.752 -0.664 -0.69 -0.552 
Table 4. The impact of structural monetary shocks on ERP: Pre and post quantitative easing 
  1989:02 - 2009:02-Pre-QE (241 observations) 2009:03 – 2014:10: Post QE (68 observations) 
ERP of FTSE Indices  (A) ?? (B) ?? (C) ?? (D) ?? 
FTSE 100 0.566** -0.712*** 1.095*** 2.367*** 
  (2.38) (-2.61) (2.66) (2.72) 
FTSE 250 0.645** -0.605** 1.864*** 2.142*** 
  (2.08) (-2.24) (3.91) (21.8) 
Basic Materials 0.521 -0.829*** 0.632 2.617*** 
  (1.39) (-2.62) (0.63) (9.03) 
Consumer Services 0.461 -0.751*** 1.07*** 1.73* 
  (1.50) (-2.78) (2.65) (1.80) 
Financials 0.634* -0.858** 1.21** 3.16** 
  (1.75) (-2.31) (2.28) (2.50) 
Consumer Goods -0.248 -0.639* 1.38*** 1.78*** 
  (-0.65) (-1.74) (4.60) (2.48) 
Healthcare 0.453* -0.536** 1.19** -0.113 
  (1.76) (-1.96) (3.00) (-0.89) 
Industrials 0.321 -0.764** 1.27*** 2.14*** 
  (0.94) (-2.37) (2.79) (5.17) 
Oil and Gas 0.551* -0.552 0.498 1.97** 
  (1.70) (-1.35) (1.01) (2.20) 
Utilities 0.569*** -0.324 1.15*** 0.54 
  (30.64) (-1.01) (3.11) (0.64) 
Telecom 0.399 -0.771** 1.30*** 0.085 
  (1.52) (-2.29) (2.67) (0.09) 
Technology -0.05 -1.10*** 1.936*** 2.09* 
  (0.91) (-3.67) (2.97) (1.85) 
Note: The model estimated is (9). The dependent variable is the ERP of the FTSE indices (in percent). The independent variable is 
the domestic monetary policy shock in the UK. Two different samples are used. The pre-QE adjusted sample is from Feb-1989 to 
Feb-2009 and the post QE sample is March -2009 to till Oct-2010.  The data is monthly. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% 
and * significant at 10%. The coefficients denote monthly sensitivities of the ERP of the FTSE indices to monetary policy shocks (in 
decimals). Figures in the parentheses are z-statistics. 
Table 5. The impact of structural monetary policy shocks on the ERP of the 25 value-weighted Fama-French 
portfolios: pre and post quantitative easing 
Before QE After QE 
?? ?? 
Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average
Growth 0.5 0.48 0.34 0.70* 0.62** 0.528 Growth 1.09** 1.45** 1.99*** 1.53*** 1.07 1.426 
BM2 0.65* 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.69*** 0.556 BM2 1.39*** 2.19*** 2.19*** 1.45** 0.63 1.57 
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Table 5. (cont.). The impact of structural monetary policy shocks on the ERP of the 25 value-weighted Fa-
ma-French portfolios: pre and post quantitative easing  
BM3 0.66** 0.28 0.57* 0.69** 0.69*** 0.578 BM3 2.80*** 1.83*** 1.58*** 1.99*** 1.27 1.894 
BM4 0.83*** 0.57 -0.91 0.42 0.39 0.26 BM4 2.04*** 1.82*** 1.54*** 1.93*** 1.2 1.706 
Value 0.75*** 0.80** 1.23*** 0.87** 0.67** 0.864 Value 2.03*** 2.02*** 1.51** 2.03*** 0.89 1.696 
Average 0.678 0.508 0.344 0.644 0.612 Average 1.87 1.862 1.762 1.786 1.012 
?? ?? 
Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average 
Growth -0.66** -0.95*** -0.25 -0.38 -0.39 -0.526 Growth -0.72*** 2.20* 2.13 2.12** 1.51* 1.45 
BM2 -0.58** -0.54* -1.05*** -0.73** -1.02*** -0.784 BM2 2.01 2.41* 1.54*** 1.89*** 1.66 1.902 
BM3 -0.78*** -0.73** -0.72** -0.96*** -0.70*** -0.778 BM3 2.81** 1.79 2.02* 2.29* 3.44*** 2.47 
BM4 -1.01*** -1.07*** -0.42 -0.85*** -0.63** -0.796 BM4 2.64*** 1.64 3.37 3.04 1.63** 2.464 
Value -0.95*** -0.87** -1.25*** -1.13*** -0.68*** -0.976 Value 3.51*** 4.93** 3.69** 3.13* 1.69** 3.39 
Average -0.796 -0.832 -0.738 -0.81 -0.684 Average 2.05 2.594 2.55 2.494 1.986 
Note: The model estimated is (9). The dependent variable is the ERP of the 25 Fama-French style portfolios. The independent varia-
ble is the structural domestic monetary policy shock in the UK. Two different samples are used. The Before-QE adjusted sample is 
from Feb-1989 to Feb-2009 and the After QE sample is March -2009 to till Oct-2010.  The data is monthly. *** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.  
Table 6. The impact of monetary policy shocks on ERP using base rate as monetary policy instrument. 
ERP of FTSE Indices ?? ?? ?? Wald’s F-stat(Null: ?? ? ?? ? ?) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
FTSE 100 0.51*** -0.64*** 8.93*** 13.31*** 
  (2.59) (-2.64) (4.68)  
FTSE 250 0.74*** -0.54 8.99*** 12.52*** 
  (3.20) (-1.56) (4.97)  
Basic materials 0.40 -0.78* 15.09** 4.19** 
  (1.31) (-1.69) (2.47)  
Consumer services 0.54** -0.68** 6.71*** 7.98*** 
  (2.46) (-2.05) (3.72)  
Financials 0.60** -0.77** 12.46*** 16.40*** 
  (2.46) (-2.36) (5.39)  
Consumer goods 0.59** -0.50 3.20 1.84 
  (2.16) (-1.45) (1.40)  
Healthcare 0.59*** -0.50* 4.53*** 15.01*** 
  (2.85) (-1.92) (5.46)  
Industrials 0.50* -0.65* 8.23*** 5.02*** 
  (1.79) (-1.78) (2.76)  
Oil and gas 0.39 -0.51* 10.18*** 14.37*** 
  (1.38) (-1.89) (5.20)  
Utilities 0.90*** 0.19 -0.35 0.19 
  (4.44) (0.61) (-0.07)  
Telecom 0.57** -0.73** 3.00 3.03** 
  (2.26) (-2.37) (0.99)  
Technology 0.39 -1.00* 9.65*** 31.49*** 
(1.20) (-1.83) (7.83)  
Note: The model estimated is (10). The dependent variable is the ERP of the FTSE indices (in percent). The independent variables 
are the structural base rate shock and the interaction between them and the QE announcement months in the UK. Adjusted sample 
size Feb 1989 – Oct 2014 (no. of observations 309). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. Figures in 
the parentheses are z-statistics.  
Table 7. The Impact of monetary policy shocks on the ERP of the 25 value-weighted  Fama-French portfolios 
Panel A 
?? Z-stat 
 Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average     
Growth 0.68*** 0.48* 0.73*** 0.86*** 0.73*** 0.696 (2.74) (1.74) (2.72) (3.1) (3.82) 
BM2 0.89*** 0.41 0.74** 0.73** 0.66*** 0.686 (3.89) (1.2) (2.55) (2.46) (2.83) 
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Table 7. (cont.). The Impact of monetary policy shocks on the ERP of the 25 value-weighted  Fama-French portfolios  
BM3 0.93*** 0.69** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.68*** 0.778 (4.21) (2.35) (2.85) (2.83) (2.61) 
BM4 0.96*** 0.84*** 0.51* 0.65** 0.53** 0.698 (4.32) (3.12) (1.69) (2.5) (2.46) 
Value 0.94*** 0.84*** 1.15*** 0.93*** 0.59** 0.89 (4.3) (2.91) (4.19) (3.51) (2.3) 
Average 0.88 0.652 0.782 0.796 0.638      
Panel B  
?? Z-stat 
 Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average     
Growth -0.65 -0.77** -0.21 -0.26 -0.3 -0.438 (-1.18) (-1.99) (-0.48) (-0.67) -1.15 
BM2 -0.48 -0.03 -0.98** -0.68 -0.94*** -0.622 (-1.14) (-0.08) (-2.23) (-1.47) (-3.53) 
BM3 -0.78* -0.64 -0.63 -0.81** -0.61* -0.694 (-1.75) (-1.33) (-1.58) (-2.20) (-1.90) 
BM4 -1.00** -1.06** -0.37 -0.78** -0.49* -0.74 (-2.43) (-2.34) (-0.89) (-1.98) (-1.95) 
Value -0.92** -0.85** -1.25*** -1.09*** -0.61 -0.944 (-2.15) (-2.39) (-2.85) (-2.85) (-1.61) 
Average -0.766 -0.67 -0.688 -0.724 -0.59      
Panel C  
?? Z-stat 
 Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large Average     
Growth 4.28** 6.29*** 4.87*** 7.52*** 3.96** 5.74 (2.3) (3.1) (4.31) (5.65) (2.37) 
BM2 -0.72 7.87*** 12.29*** 11.12*** 10.08*** 7.64 (-0.21) (3.38) (3.91) (3.03) (6.02) 
BM3 6.36 4.70*** 8.06*** 7.07*** 9.24*** 6.548 (1.52) (2.58) (2.76) (3.78) (3.39) 
BM4 7.46* 8.63* 9.75*** 14.29** 7.84*** 10.03 (1.76) (1.8) (3.67) (2.23) (3.58) 
Value 9.54 20.73** 13.99** 13.72*** 8.60*** 14.5 (1.53) (2.2) (1.98) (3.08) (3.41) 
Average 5.384 9.644 9.792 10.74 7.944      
Panel D      
Wald's Statistics (?????? ? ?? ? ??      
 Small Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Large      
Growth 2.87* 5.87*** 10.25*** 16.53*** 3.15**      
BM2 0.71 5.79*** 9.24*** 5.11*** 21.03***      
BM3 2.46* 3.56** 4.68*** 8.33*** 6.82*** 
BM4 4.18** 4.01** 6.76*** 4.69*** 7.85*** 
Value 3.33** 5.23*** 5.87*** 7.99*** 6.28*** 
Note: The model estimated is (10). The dependent variable is the ERP of the 25 Fama-French portfolios in percent.  The indepen-
dent variable is the domestic monetary policy shock in the UK. Adjusted sample size 1988:08 – 2014:10 (no. of observations 315) 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.Figures in the parentheses are z-statistics. 
